SECOND QUARTER 2010
| Performance* |
Second Quarter |
Year- To-Date |
Since Inception** |
| FI Concentrated Value Composite (gross of mgmt fees) |
(8.1%) |
(3.4%) |
2.7% |
| FI Concentrated Value Composite (net of mgmt fees) |
(8.2%) |
(3.7%) |
1.8% |
| Russell 1000® Value Index |
(11.2%) |
(5.1%) |
(5.5%) |
* Important performance disclosures are included at the end of this letter.
** Annualized. Inception Date: 8/1/06.
|
Last quarter's decline in stock prices more than offset the gains enjoyed by investors
during the first quarter of the year, marking an abrupt end to a four-quarter winning streak of
positive stock market returns. Multiple concerns including the effects of both the overseas debt
crisis and the stubbornly high U.S. unemployment rate caused investors to question the current
pace of the economic recovery. The equity market run-up that began in March 2009 was led
largely by economically sensitive companies whose stock prices by April 2010 had reached
levels that reflected the expectation of a strong rebound in revenues and earnings. Unfortunately,
these valuations proved difficult to sustain as investors' faith in this rebound waivered. We
expect market volatility to continue as investors struggle to predict the direction of the economy
and the implications for corporate revenues and profits. We learned long ago that our ability to
make such predictions was limited and, quite frankly, not necessary for making sound long-term
investment decisions.
We also learned long ago not to be overly concerned with short-term weakness in stock
prices. In fact, we welcome the opportunity to add new companies to our portfolio at attractive
prices as a result of market declines. We did just that last quarter by buying new positions in
IBM and Goldman Sachs. Our focus is on changes in the underlying profits of the companies we
own. Based on that measure, our overall portfolio continues to perform well. As we have written
in the past, if the companies in our portfolio increase their revenues, earnings and cash flow over
time, their stock prices will eventually follow suit.
Our portfolio reflects our best 15-25 ideas with little consideration given to how the
resulting mix of companies compares to our benchmark. However, such a comparison is useful
in understanding our relative short-term performance. The following discussion compares our
portfolio weightings to those of our benchmark, the Russell 1000® Value Index, a well-known
and commonly accepted value index indicative of our investment style.
Given the broad-based nature of last quarter's market sell-off in which all ten of the
benchmark's sectors declined, it was almost impossible to avoid reporting negative performance
and we were no exception. However, we did manage to out-perform our benchmark. We
achieved this in part due to the relatively strong performance of our Consumer Discretionary
holdings and our significant underweighting in Financials and Industrials which were both
among the benchmark's weaker performing sectors. Detracting from our relative performance
was our lack of exposure to the benchmark's two best-performing sectors: Telecommunication
Services and Utilities. The following paragraphs discuss several of our portfolio holdings that
detracted from last quarter's performance as well as our two new additions to the portfolio.
Microsoft was our worst performing stock last quarter. Investors are concerned with the
growing proliferation of non-Windows based mobile computing devices, including smartphones
and tablets which cannibalize sales of Windows based notebooks and computers. The increasing
availability of web-based application software poses a threat to Microsoft's traditional computer
installed software. For instance, Google provides free web-based versions of slimmed down
application software similar to Word, Excel and PowerPoint, three of the most popular
applications in Microsoft Office. Finally, consumers and businesses have been slow to upgrade
to Microsoft's newest product versions.
While these concerns are legitimate, we believe investors are underestimating
Microsoft's strengths. The company's Windows operating system and Windows Office
applications dominate the market for business and personal computers, and we think this
dominance will persist for some time. Microsoft is devoting substantial resources to develop
products to compete in the mobile device market and, if successful, these products could provide
a meaningful source of growth. The company is also developing web-based versions of its most
popular products to compliment its traditional software products. Finally, as consumer and
business spending recovers, we expect to see an increase in upgrade activity to Microsoft's
newer product versions.
We think Microsoft is undervalued at its current share price of roughly 11X forward
earnings with roughly $40 billion in cash and short-term investments (over $4/share) on its
balance sheet. The company generates substantial free cash flow, a meaningful portion of which
we expect will be returned to shareholders through share repurchases and cash dividends.
In early June, Walgreen announced that it would no longer participate in any future
pharmacy benefit management (PBM) plans offered by CVS Caremark, depressing the share
prices for both companies. Walgreen appeared to be engaging in a very harsh negotiating tactic
to force an increase in the PBM drug reimbursement rates paid to it by CVS Caremark. Walgreen
most likely assumed that CVS Caremark would avoid a confrontation that might hamper its
ability to effectively compete for new clients in its PBM business, especially since CVS
Caremark had suffered several large PBM client losses at the end of 2009. Initially Walgreen's
move looked cleverly designed to inflict immediate pain on CVS Caremark but spread its
anticipated revenue loss over a multi-year period thereby easing the impact on its financial
results.
However, CVS Caremark was just as clever in its response by announcing the immediate
termination of its business relationship with Walgreen rather than allowing it to wind down over
a multi-year period. This meant that Walgreen would be forced to absorb the anticipated revenue
loss immediately rather than over several years. Not surprisingly, within days of CVS
Caremark's announcement, the two companies resolved their differences and reversed their
earlier decisions.
We were disappointed with Walgreen management's initial approach to resolving this
disagreement with CVS Caremark and were equally disappointed with their failure to provide a
persuasive explanation for the rationale supporting their decision. Walgreen was one of the least
undervalued companies in our portfolio. When we decided to increase our positions in two of our
other more undervalued companies, Walgreen was the logical position to sell to fund the
purchases.
Earlier in the quarter we sold some UnitedHealth and NIKE to fund the initial purchases
of our two new holdings. Since our portfolio is generally fully invested, we almost always need
to reduce or sell a position in order to buy a new company or add to an existing position. Our
goal is to constantly strive to have the highest quality, most undervalued portfolio possible by
selling companies with higher price-to-value ratios and reinvesting in more undervalued
companies.
Walmart's sales results in its U.S. discount store business remain sluggish reflecting both
a weak retailing environment and management missteps in pricing and merchandising. In an
attempt to improve customers' shopping experience, the company has been remodeling stores
and reducing merchandise stock keeping units (SKUs), giving the stores a cleaner, less cluttered
look. However, the remodeling efforts have been disruptive and customers have complained
about the reduced assortment resulting from the eliminated SKUs. Furthermore, the company
implemented price rollbacks in some categories in which it already held a dominant market share
position. Thus the lower prices failed to generate incremental unit sales. In response to these
missteps, Walmart recently announced several changes in its senior management. Walmart's
deep management bench provides the company with the flexibility to make management changes
as needed.
Despite the weak U.S. same store sales, Walmart reported low double digit EPS growth
in its most recent quarter. These results were driven by strong international operations (a
growing portion of the company), positive operating leverage and a reduced share count
reflecting a substantial share repurchase program. As the company's growth opportunities
decline so does its need to reinvest capital in the business, contributing to substantial free cash
flow. Management has an outstanding track record of returning excess cash to shareholders.
During the past three years, the company has repurchased $18.5 billion of its own stock. Last
quarter the Company's Board approved an additional $15 billion share repurchase program
which represents over 8% of its current shares outstanding. The company has increased its
dividend every year since 1974. We believe Walmart will prove to be a very profitable long-term
investment.
IBM was a new addition to our portfolio during the quarter. IBM has transformed itself
over the past two decades into an information and technology services and software company.
On the services side, IBM offers outsourcing (data centers), maintenance, consulting, and
systems integration and application management. IBM's software applications allow companies
to store, share and manage information more efficiently. In 2009, services and software
represented 84% of pretax income, while hardware and related financing represented the
remaining 16%.
As IBM has changed its business mix towards more predictable and profitable services
and software, the company has also focused on becoming a leaner, more efficient organization
with a constant focus on reducing expenses while maintaining and improving service quality. For
the past seven years during which Sam Palmisano has served as Chairman and CEO, the
company has reported consecutive double-digit earnings per share growth. This EPS growth has
been driven by a strategy of consistent organic revenue growth, margin expansion, share
repurchases, and selected acquisitions.
Management recently laid out its plan for achieving 2015 EPS of at least $20 using the
same strategy that has worked so successfully during the past seven years. While we think
management's goal is optimistic, we also believe that it is achievable. However, we have used
more conservative assumptions in our IBM valuation than those incorporated by management in
their 2015 EPS goal. Based on our valuation, IBM is selling well below our estimate of its
intrinsic value. If management is successful in achieving its more optimistic goals, then the
company is even more substantially undervalued.
Our other new position last quarter was Goldman Sachs. Goldman's stock price dropped
sharply in April after the SEC filed a lawsuit against the company. The stock weakened even
further as investors became increasingly concerned that financial reform would severely restrict
Goldman's business activities and depress its future profitability. In its lawsuit against Goldman,
the SEC alleged that the firm failed to disclose material information to investors about Abacus
2007-AC1 ("Abacus"), a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) sold to them by Goldman.
Specifically, the SEC alleged that Paulson & Co. (a now well-known hedge fund that profited
handsomely from the meltdown in residential real estate prices) was involved in selecting
mortgage backed securities that were used to construct the CDO sold by Goldman. Furthermore,
the SEC alleged that Goldman hid Paulson's involvement in selecting securities for this CDO
and misled investors into believing that Paulson was going to be an investor in Abacus when in
fact, Paulson was betting that Abacus would fall in value.
There was significant public debate about the merits, motivation and timing of this
lawsuit. Regardless, once the lawsuit had been filed we believed it was in Goldman's best long-term
interest to reach a quick settlement with the SEC. Battling the SEC in court would have
exposed Goldman to the risk of permanent reputational damage, client defections and a possible
(although we believed unlikely) negative verdict. We also concluded that the SEC would favor a
settlement which it could then publicly proclaim as a victory while avoiding the possible
embarrassment of a loss in court. In fact, a few days after quarter-end Goldman announced a
$550 million after tax (roughly $1 per share) settlement with the SEC which was greeted
enthusiastically by investors and was far less than what we had assumed in our analysis.
Although the SEC lawsuit against Goldman received the most press, financial reform had
the potential for the most profound impact on the company's intrinsic value. Financial reform
was aimed mainly at preventing banks from engaging in overly risky activities that might lead to
taxpayer funded bailouts. Goldman is subject to bank related rules and regulations because of its
decision to become a bank holding company during the height of the recent financial crisis. As
the quarter progressed, it seemed likely to us that financial reform would be enacted and would
require higher capital requirements and impose new restrictions on derivatives trading activities
and place limits on proprietary trading (the so called "Volcker Rule"). The effects of financial
reform were clear: to reduce the future profitability of the companies affected.
We bought Goldman when its share price dropped to 1.2x tangible book value, a level
which we believed discounted both a large settlement with the SEC and a substantial reduction in
future profitability. While it will take years to determine the final impact of financial reform, we
believe it is highly unlikely to depress Goldman's profitability to levels low enough to justify the
current share price. If Goldman is successful in structuring its business to mitigate the effects of
financial reform (possibly by abandoning its bank charter) or if the final rules are watered down,
Goldman may very well be one of the cheapest stocks in our portfolio.
Health Care stocks declined last quarter as investors continued to grapple with the long-term
implications of the health care reform legislation enacted last March. "The devil is in the
details" aptly describes both health care reform and the just passed financial reform. While these
new laws enact broad-based changes and requirements, the actual implementation details are still
being hammered out. It will take months and in some cases years before their ultimate impact is
known. We feel comfortable that the current valuations of our health care and financial holdings
provide significant enough margins of safety to protect against the ultimate consequences of
these new laws.
In previous letters, we have pointed out that U.S. dollar weakness provides a foreign
currency benefit in reported earnings for companies with sizeable international operations such
as McDonald's. This obviously works in reverse as well. Due to the U.S. dollar's recent strength
relative to the Euro, these companies will experience a foreign currency headwind instead. We
view these currency swings as largely noise and tend to ignore them in our analysis of underlying
revenue and earnings trends. However, exchange rates do impact the value of future cash flows
so we use the most current rates in our valuation models. The most recent changes are not
material to the valuations of the companies we own.
As always, our commitment to our clients is unchanged: we will remain rational,
disciplined investors as we search for opportunities to preserve and compound the capital that
has been entrusted to us.
Thank you for your continued interest in Focused Investors.
| Bruce G. Veaco | Nugroho (Dédé) Soeharto |
| Partner and | | Portfolio Manager |
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| Partner and | | Portfolio Manager |
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Performance Disclosures
Focused Investors ("FI") Concentrated Value Composite contains all fully discretionary, fee-paying accounts
that are managed according to FI's concentrated value strategy. Performance is calculated on a total return
basis, which includes reinvestment of all income, plus realized and unrealized capital gains and/or losses, as
applicable. Individual account performance will vary depending upon, among other things, the account's cash
flows and market conditions prevailing at the time of investment.
Gross of management fees performance is presented before management and custodial fees but after trading
expenses. Net of management fees performance is calculated using a model fee. The model fee is one-twelfth of
the highest annual management fee borne by any account in the composite (1%) and is deducted from the
monthly gross composite return to arrive at the net of fee composite return. Actual fees vary. FI's management
fees are more fully described in Form ADV Part II which is available upon request.
FI seeks to achieve long-term capital appreciation through a concentrated value-oriented investment strategy.
FI's concentrated value strategy invests client assets primarily in common stocks of companies that are
trading at prices significantly below FI's estimate of their intrinsic values at the time of initial purchase. FI
believes that it generally takes several years for the gap between the price of an undervalued security and FI's
estimate of its intrinsic value to close, if at all. In this regard, FI's concentrated value strategy is best suited
for investors with a long-term investment horizon (i.e., no less than five years). Because FI's portfolios are
relatively concentrated, the performance of each holding will have a greater impact on an account's total
return and may make the return more volatile than a more diversified portfolio. As with any investment
vehicle, there is always the potential for gain as well as the possibility of loss.
The Russell 1000 Value® Index (the "Index") measures the performance of the large-cap value segment of the
U.S. equity universe. The Index includes those Russell 1000® companies with lower price-to-book ratios and
lower expected growth values. The Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased barometer
for the large-cap value segment. The Index is completely reconstituted annually to ensure that the represented
companies continue to reflect value characteristics. Performance returns for the Index do not reflect
transaction costs, management fees, or other expenses that would be incurred in managing an account. While
FI's objective is to outperform the Index, this does not imply that FI's portfolio strategy will share or track the
same or similar characteristics as the Index. In addition, there is no guarantee that FI will achieve its
objective.
Forward-Looking Statements
As investment managers, one of our responsibilities is to communicate with our investors in an open and direct
manner. In so far as some of our opinions and comments in our letters are based on current management
expectations, they are considered "forward-looking statements" which may or may not be accurate over the
long-term. While we believe we have a reasonable basis for our comments and we have confidence in our
opinions, actual results may differ materially from those we anticipate. You can identify forward-looking
statements by words such as "believe," "expect," "may," "anticipate," and other similar expressions when
discussing prospects for particular portfolio holdings and/or the markets, generally. We cannot, however,
assure future results and disclaim any obligation to update or alter any forward-looking statements, whether
as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. Further, information provided in this letter should
not be considered a recommendation to purchase or sell any particular security.
Form ADV
Our most recent Form ADV (Parts I and II) is available at . If you would like to
receive a printed copy of either, please contact us.
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